anonymous
2011-05-15 13:09:41 UTC
Registering for an AKO account is mandatory upon enlistment with the United States Army. AKO access is governed by DoD security policy. The log-on security feature is accomplished by password or by a combination of a CAC and PIN. The password requirement is stringent; it must contain at least 2 uppercase letters, 2 lowercase letters, 2 numbers, and 2 special characters. Passwords expire every 150 days, and may not be replaced by any password used the previous ten times. Since July 2010, Soldiers have also had to answer 3 out of 15 personal questions of their own choosing as an added security feature. Nevertheless, all of these features failed when the Keystroke program was used to hack into SSG Long’s AKO account when he was logged in with his CAC.
This was not accomplished by Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or even the Taliban. These hacks were executed by average citizens seemingly without AKO Network Systems Administrator knowledge.
These breaches into the AKO’s security have cost SSG Long thousands of dollars in forgeries due to his financial information being obtained through his AKO and his MyPay accounts. Additionally, two other Soldiers’ AKO and MyPay accounts were exposed to the potential hacking. Unfortunately, these two other Soldiers had logged into their AKO from SSG Long's home computer that had the hidden Keystroke program on it. No attempts have been made to investigate or validate whether there was a breach in other two Soldiers’ AKO and MyPay accounts. Furthermore, the United States Army has attempted to silence SSG Long on this issue with threats of UCMJ actions and black listing.
In 2009, SSG Long filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Sparta Police Department Case # 09-1444,
Officer C. Itnyre, Badge 57. In March 2011, the Sparta Wisconsin Police Department received confirmation from Madison Wisconsin’s Computer Forensic Service Unit that the spyware were on SSG Long's computer. Despite having confirmed evidence from AKO Network Systems Administrator, testimonies under oath, and Madison’s Computer Forensic Service Unit, there would appear to be an attempt from the United States Army and the Sparta Police Department to stall the proceedings.
The Keystroke program on SSG Long’s computer was first discovered in May 2009. Consequently, the perpetrators were able to access everything on SSG Long’s account for approximately 18 months.
There are two issues here: One issue being a crime was committed against a Soldier that led to other crimes. Secondly, there is a network security issue with AKO and MyPay. There have been security features changed and adjusted over the past couple of years on these systems, but there are still enormous vulnerabilities. AKO is not just an email account system; AKO is “one stop shopping” for a Soldier. The following are just a few of the items that are stored or accessed through AKO: training records, Personally Identifiable Information (PII), sensitive but unclassified information, high school diploma’s, college transcripts, SF 86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions information, medical history, awards, DD214 Certificate Of Release Or Discharge From Active Duty, bank account information, and specific Military Occupational Specialty manuals and tradecraft information.
There would appear to be a great effort by the United States Army in trying to keep outside sources, including the media, from knowing about this. They have impeded in helping SSG Long’s progress by downplaying the effects, refusing to put in writing what services and aides are available to him, not contacting the local law enforcement to validate the crime, and a lot of finger pointing to send SSG Long on an aimless scavenger hunt. They have suggested that he obtain a civilian attorney as they see this as a civil matter not a criminal one. I have plenty of documentation and evidence to substantiate all these facts!
Please help bring awareness to this egregious disservice to all knowing and unknowing Soldiers.
Gmail: long.ian369@gmail.com
AKO: ian.e.long@us.army.mil